Stage I of the project
Ø
Analysis of filling technologies used in the disposal rooms of LLW and
ILW, in the case of DNDR similar deposits and selecting filling
technology applicable to DNDR Băiţa, Bihor.
Ø
Laboratory Experiments on the behavior of filing materials in saturated
medium. Proposals of alternatives for gaps filling.
Ø
Analysis of the reaction in time of the storage system of packages with
radioactive waste, in terms of changing the technology for filling gaps
In the case of works done in this stage, an assessment was carried out
on the experience and the current practices of storing LLW and ILW in
the European Union. Emphasis was placed on the operation and management
of these deposits and on their evolution over time. In many cases, the
deposits were initially established as facilities necessary for waste
management at private or national research centers, from the fuel cycle
related stations or electricity generation ones. Over time, many have
been adopted as national deposits even though many times they were still
managed by the initial organization. As national waste management
organizations were created, the responsibilities related to the
property, investments, financing, management and operation of these
facilities have also evolved. The various deposits analyzed showed
variations on the nature and scope of such development in the different
countries.
The report is structured to provide:
Ø
An overview of the main technical requirements for radioactive waste
deposits;
Ø
An overview of the various types of deposits in operation;
Ø
Detailed description of the deposits that are similar to the deposit at
Băiţa, Bihor;
Ø
Detailed descriptions of deposits that represent "best practices" in the
EU.
The report concludes that there is a wide range of storage concepts of
LLW and ILW in the course of implementation within the European Union.
The selection of these concepts is determined by:
Ø
The types and volumes of generated waste
Ø
National strategy for radioactive waste management
Ø
Regulatory approach for managing waste safely
The degree of isolation of the waste repository for the environment
depends on the waste-storage system performance as a whole, taking into
account the waste package, engineering works in the deposit and the
geology of the site. These components of the system must be selected or
designed in such a way that as a global system to ensure the isolation
required by the radiological safety of the population and the
environment now and in the future at a predetermined level.
All these components have a specific role, depending on the method of
storage and represent a unique system, able to meet the main objective
of radiological safety, which is to prevent, delay and limit the release
of radionuclides from the waste in the environment, at a level at which
adverse effects would remain acceptable. In addition, the institutional
control and passive markers must be implemented, at the system
components (natural and engineering), which can facilitate, at least for
a while, the protection against human intrusion.
At the same time, an important goal of the project is shaping the
release of radionuclides in the disposal galleries. For a robust
assessment on implementation of engineering barriers, have been studied
practices used for similar deposits (in geological formations),
experiments conducted for the analysis of their effectiveness, the
proposed in-situ and laboratory experiments and the assessment of the
reaction over time.
In this stage, were evaluated two different modeling concepts for the
source term. First concept is based on computer analytical approaches
developed previously by the research team. These approximations have a
high conservative degree and are the upper limit for the release of the
radionuclides in the disposal galleries. At the base of these
approximations is the mixed cells cascade concept, based on fundamental
hypotheses widely used for this case. The second concept developed by
this work, for the evaluation of the source team, is represented by a
complex approach of the numerical solution of radionuclide transport
equation. The release from the waste form includes three mechanisms:
surface rinsing, diffusion and leakage (uniform release). These release
mechanisms, can be optionally represented, either analytic or numeric.
Within simulations in this work, was preferred the numerical modeling of
the release mechanisms. Simulations based on the transport equation
solution were performed with DUST-MS software and considered a
mono-dimensional simulation of the disposal gallery.
In order to improve the insulation of radiological waste and
radiological safety, it is suggested to lay out the first 3 rows of
packages, fill the gaps between them, and then place the next two lines,
following the closure of the gallery. Metal casings, will be made in two
phases, respectively, for the first three rows and then for the last two
rows.
The methods of filling the gaps between the packages, the following are
suggested:
OPTION I MODIFICATION OF GAPS FILLING
I.1 Filling with damp materials:
- I.1.1 Bentonite slim paste (bentonite + water + cement + sand)
- I.1.2 Bentonite concrete paste (bentonite + water + cement)
- I.1.3 Alcaline concrete paste (bentonite + water + limestone powder)
I.2 Filling with dry materials:
It is also suggested the settlement of the first 3 rows of packages,
filling the gaps between them, and then placing the next two lines, and
then, following the closure of the gallery.
As methods of filling with dry materials of the gaps between the
packages, the following three are proposed, related to the second
option:
- I.2.1 Powder bentonite;
- I.2.2 Powder bentonite + sand – in proportion of 50%, each;
- I.2.3 Powder bentonite 30% + clay 20% + sand 50%.
In all sub-options used, it is necessary to use mobile equipment, for
the transfer of damp materials, respectively, a pneumatic transport
system of dry material, through flexible hose/tubes.
OPTION II INCREASE OF ISOLATION DEGREE
In order to increase the degree of insulation of waste packages was
determined, during the course of this phase, the need to assess the use
of modern insulation materials, such as geomebranes and geocomposites.
Two insulation options have been identified, namely:
II.1 The fitting of a multilayer system, on the walls and the vault of
each storage gallery, to isolate the radioactive waste packages, similar
to the technical solution used in The Czech Republic, at Richard
Repository.
II. 2 Coating the barrel layers of each gallery, with a multilayered
system, consisting of a bentonite geocomposite and a geomembrane.
The analysis of the possibility to apply these additional sub-options
will be carried out later.
Bentonite geocomposites (known in the engineering practice by the
English term Geosynthetic Clay Liner), are defined as manufactured
products, that associate geosynthetic materials and bentonite, being
used in the construction industry and geotechnics, in order to achieve a
tight barrier.
These have appeared as a result of the need to achieve a tight effective
barrier, using a material easy to put in the work, uniform and resistant
to punching. These products combine a natural material, bentonite, which
presents a very low permeability due to its swelling capacity, with
geosynthetic materials, which have a protective role and possibly a
sealing role.
Stage II of the project
In order to achieve the objectives of this stage, there were considered
the essential principles that must underpin the DNDR Closing Strategy in
compliance with the nuclear safety conditions summarized below.
A storage facility has to be closed after the operation period so as to
provide those safety features which have been identified as being
important in the post-closure safety scenario. Closure plans which
include the transition from active to inactive management of the
facility will be defined and practicable so that the closure is
performed safely, as planned.
The safety of a facility depends on a number of activities and design
features including the filling and sealing or blocking of the
disposal facility after
disposal. The disposal facility should be closed according to the closing requirements specified
by a regulating entity in the facility authorization, taking into
account any change that may occur during closure.
Filling gaps and placing seals or locks may be delayed for a period
after the completion of waste disposal, for example to allow monitoring
in order to assess safety aspects after closure or for reasons of public
acceptance.
All technical and financial resources necessary for closing under
nuclear safety conditions must be adequately ensured.
The main performance requirements for filling consist of the capacity to
prevent preferential paths for the migration of contaminants in the
vertical and horizontal directions and provide a certain support to
sustain the walls of the gallery (in the vertical direction).
With DNDR, an important objective of the project is modelling the
release of radionuclides from radioactive waste disposal galleries.
The major objective is to evaluate
the current practice for filling the access and ventilation galleries
with materials which comply with the security requirements, finding
effective solutions for isolation or delay of radionuclide migration by
creating an additional global "confinement" of conditioned radioactive
waste disposed at DNDR Baita, Bihor.
During this stage, the Consortium members developed the subsections
listed below, as planned.
Evaluation of the closing technology used in other countries for similar
installations. Preliminary feasible options for DNDR
In this chapter, radioactive waste streams were reviewed, estimated to
be deposited DNDR, also attaining an updated inventory, presenting the
physicochemical properties of the waste. To achieve consistent and
robust analysis there were presented the technologies applied in the
management of stored radioactive waste in order to demonstrate the
fulfilment of acceptance criteria, according to the authorized limits
(WAC).
The natural environment chosen as location was also rated.
The policy broadly adopted for radioactive waste disposal involves their
placement in a repository designed not to lose containment functions for
a wide range of events and to prevent radionuclides release in
quantities which could endanger humanity and the biosphere.
Since DNDR is considered a geological repository, according to IAEA
documents, the issue regarding the reversibility of decisions and
recoverability of waste inherently occurs, although, so far, these
possibilities have not been considered. Moreover, the deposit
characteristics imposed the DNDR evaluation in terms of nuclear safety
as a surface deposit.
In addition, to facilitate feasible technical decision making concerning
the closing concept at DNDR – Baita, there have been conducted studies
on the concepts developed or to be developed, to European facilities
with similar characteristics. These studies have focussed on three
components:
Ø
Overall strategy: with or without waste retrieval;
Ø
Approaching nuclear safety, disposal system performance;
Ø
Foreseen closing plan.
Ø
The report concludes that there is a wide range of storage concepts for
low and intermediate level waste being implemented in the European
Union. The selection of these concepts is determined by:
Ø
The types and amount of waste generated;
Ø
National Strategy for radioactive waste management;
Ø
Regulations for safe waste management.
There are some analogies appropriate for DNDR-Baita Bihor in
KLDRA-Himdalen-Norway and Bratsvi/Richard-Czech Republic, which were
described in detail. These deposits have similarities in terms of waste
inventory and origin, similar concepts on storage in mine galleries and
similar concepts on closing.
Proposal for DNDR closing technology based on preliminary experimental
data obtained
In this subchapter, we analyzed and evaluated filling materials and
concepts used in similar facilities. The requirements of a repository
sealing system protrudes that the filling has certain fundamental
characteristics. These include recreating the equivalent initial
groundwater flow and geochemical/transport conditions of the repository
site. In order to meet these requirements, the filler must be capable of
ensuring that the swelling clay, used as a buffer material, stays in the
original place if it comes in contact with the corrosion-resistant
packages used to dispose the radioactive waste.
In conclusion, the overall function of the filler (assumed to be clay,
an aggregate or a mixture of such materials) may be achieved by
maximizing the dry density of the filler and by minimizing void spaces
in the sealed galleries. In order to achieve this, the focused was on
the development of improved compaction and appropriate techniques for
placing the filler.
In order to achieve its purpose, the filler must be chemically and
mechanically stable on long term and should not have or develop
properties that could degrade significantly the function of other
barriers in the storage system. This has been interpreted as meaning
that the filler should be sufficiently compact in order to preserve the
buffer material set in the designed geometry, which has a hydraulic
conductivity low enough to prevent the movement of contaminated water.
The interactions between bentonite and cement were also examined. The
interaction between the bentonite buffer material and the small amount
of alkaline solution in the cement based material degraded, used in the
construction and operation of the deposit, is considered to be hazardous
in the long term for the chemical stability of the bentonite. In this
report, calculations of the transport patterns have been performed to
emphasize the alteration of the bentonite due to the small amount of
alkaline solution. In case of one-dimensional calculation models, most
of the primary minerals in the bentonite cannot re-precipitate and form
structures with other smectites.
Based on these evaluations, a preliminary solution regarding the closing
concept at DNDR - Baita was determined. Closure will be performed in
accordance with the approved closure plan, which will include updating
safety assessments and a description of the planned checks for the
post-closure phase, the monitoring and surveillance program and the
record keeping system.
A preliminary analysis revealed that the material filling the access
galleries is the host rock previously excavated, processed by crushing
to be brought to the size of ballast used for roads.
The following galleries are to be sealed at DNDR closure:
Ø
Access gallery, of approx. 240 m length;
Ø
Ventilation gallery, of approx. 340 m length.
This preliminary concept proposes that the filling is performed in 50 m
sections.
There will be used four sections of 240 m for filling the access
gallery, and 6 venting sections, of 340 m.
A. The main materials used and their justification
1. According to preliminary analysis conducted in this project, filling
with natural host rock excavated, presents the best chemical
compatibility with storage gallery walls. The mechanical strength of
this material in the long term is superior to that of the cementitious
material. Accordingly, it is proposed to fill the galleries named above
with previously excavated rock, processed by crushing to be brought to
the size of ballast used for roads.
2. Sealant layer of approx. 3 m, consisting of a mixture of 30%
swellable bentonite, 20% non-swelling clay and 50% sand, preventing the
formation of preferential channels and the migration of radionuclides,
without affecting the other materials by excessive swelling.
3. Bentonite slurry filling between layer 2 and sealing membrane 4
intended to ensure the diffusion of potential radionuclides escaped
through the other layers.
4. 1 m thick sealing membrane, made of bentonite concrete, intended to
ensure retention of the possible radionuclides escaped by penetrating
other barriers.
5. 3 m thick bentonite concrete sealing membrane, which delimits the
gallery
disposal area.
6. Waterproofing shotcrete, made of 10 cm Xipex concrete, applied on all
surfaces of the gallery, except the floor.
7. 10 cm thick concrete bottom plate, made of porous concrete, for
drainage achieved through controlled diffusion and retention of
potential radionuclides.
A comprehensive experimental program was initiated and is to be
conducted in the future to confirm the proposed technical solutions.
B. Sealing and anti-intrusion protection
Sealing and anti-intrusion plugs will be provided in the DNDR project
feasibility phase.
There will be provided waterproof plugs, made of hydotechnical concrete,
15 m thick, at the outer ends of the access and ventilation galleries,
as well as a plug of the same material, 10 m thick, at the intersection
of the ventilation and access galleries.
The analysis of DNDR closure systems under limit conditions
Preliminary risk assessment scenarios
Developing a scenario aims to achieve a model for monitoring the
possible and plausible evolution in time. The analysis of this model
shall generate the values
of
certain safety indicators, representative for the scenario (e.g.
substance concentration at certain points in the environment or doses
received by individuals in the vicinity of the deposit) which will
indicate the safety level of the system analyzed.
Based on the methodology set out in the preliminary safety analysis, we
consider that the storage system developed in the former mining
galleries for uranium ore at Baita Bihor is and will be affected by
external, internal factors and contaminants, which can be divided into
the following categories: features, events and processes (FEPs -
Features, Events, Processes). Internal factors and contaminants are
linked to the structure of the deposit itself, framed in the gallery,
while external factors are related to the external environment of the
deposit galleries. With this approach, features, events and processes
caused by external factors are those which determine the characteristics
of the baseline scenario.
In case of radioactive waste repositories, it is important to develop
long-term scenarios after their final closing. Taking into account the
specificity of The National Repository for Radioactive Waste Baita
Bihor, which accepts low and intermediate level waste, it is considered
that a period of 10,000 years after the permanent closure of the
repository is of interest for the safety assessment. In the safety
assessment, the long term baseline scenario considered year 1985 as the
initial time of the assessment, the date of the first waste disposal at
Baita Bihor. This value is maintained in the project.
The development of a proper baseline scenario for the storage system
analyzed starts from a review of all possible external factors,
determining which of them are specific to the respective system.
In order to develop and justify the baseline scenario associated to The
National Repository for Radioactive Waste Baita Bihor, taking into
account the upgrades done so far and the waste containment solutions,
together with the closing solutions proposed in the current project, we
used the same methodological approach from the preliminary safety
assessment documentation; for a coherent analysis of the deposit
situation we used the baseline elements of this documentation, updated
according to the considerations of this project. The results of this
methodology are presented in the paper.
This project proposes the change of the buffer material between the
drums, since bentonite, in the form it is used at the moment (as
bentonite powder) has a low efficiency, in terms of long term safety of
the storage system.
Currently, the lost shuttering used to fix bentonite, is
made
of
wood. Since in time they will degrade in contact with infiltration
water, we propose the use of reusable shuttering, and the replacement of
bentonite with bentonite concrete.
The conceptual model is based on the description of the following:
Ø
Features, events and processes (FEPs) associated with the storage
system;
Ø
The relationship between features, events and processes, and
Ø
The size of the model, expressed in terms of space and time.
A schematic representation was made to the conceptual model for the
disposal subsystem, corresponding to
storage galleries without buffer material and to storage galleries with
buffer material, including the interactions between the key components
of the model.
Due to the deposit location in the mountains, the water inside the
storage system comes only from water infiltration and rainfall. The
water content in the deposit varies widely, depending on the position of
the galleries, creating well-defined "wet" and "dry" areas.
It was assumed that the concrete matrix within each drum may have
cracks, most likely resulting from contractions occurred in the initial
concrete casting in the barrel and cracks developed later.
After the loss of confinement, it is assumed that the release of
radionuclides from different types of waste can be described by the
following types conceptual models:
Ø
The delayed release through single fracture - it is considered that
radio nuclides are present in a container surrounded by an annular layer
of inactive mortar.
Ø
The heterogeneous release - it is considered that the radionuclides are
present as surface contamination on solid materials (e.g.: small metal
parts, plastic waste, etc.). It is considered that cracks occur along
the interfaces between cement and waste components.
Ø
The diffusion controlled release - in this case, it is considered that
the radionuclides are closely mixed with mortar so that the cemented
waste form provides a degree of confinement.
Ø
The heterogeneous diffusion controlled release – it is identical to the
heterogeneous release, except for the fact that some of the
contamination is located within the waste components matrix. Therefore,
diffusion inside the waste components will act to limit the advection
release rate of the heterogeneous model.
Stage II Conclusions
The main conclusion that results from the work done so far is that there
has been carried out an assessment and characterization of the following
components needed to formulate a closure concept:
Ø
Inventory of radionuclides and physicochemical characteristics;
Ø
Geological and hydro geological environment;
Ø
Treatment and storage technologies;
Ø
Engineering barriers systems;
Ø
Compliance with the acceptance criteria;
Ø
Sealing techniques and associated issues in case of similar facilities.
Based on the characterization of these components a preliminary concept
was developed, taking into account:
Ø
Fillers and related technologies;
Ø
The interaction between the filler and cement matrix used in radioactive
waste containment;
Ø
Starting an in-situ and laboratory experimental program for evaluating
the performance of the filling and closing materials.
There was also performed an analysis of external, internal factors and
contaminants, which can be divided into the following categories:
features, events and processes established in the safety analysis, as
well as a reassessment of the conceptual model and its constituents by
introducing the performance of the proposed buffer and closure
materials.
To validate the closing solution the experimental program described in
this step shall be completed, allowing the selection of the final
optimal alternative as well as the analysis of the evolution of
engineering barriers and closure materials and technologies.
In conclusion, the objectives of the stage were fully met creating the
prerequisites for further developing the next stage of the project,
namely: "
Finishing NRRW Băiţa, Bihor Closure Plan in safety conditions”
Stage III of the project
DNDR Baita Bihor closure can be considered as the last important
operation step, in addition to the storage system.
This activity is defined as a systemic activity to be carried out after
the termination of waste placing operations being carried out with the
intention to provide the final configuration of the storage system.
Closure activities must complete the storage system design because the
whole system is designed to isolate the hazardous constituents
(especially radionuclides), for an enough long period of time, which is
acceptable considering the risks posed on humanity and ecosystems. The
repository closure involves taking into consideration a combination of
factors, scientific, technical, regulatory and socioeconomic, to be
integrated and optimized for selecting alternatives acceptable from the
points of view of all stakeholders.
The engineering barriers system is essential in the storage security
scenario. Even if the host rock provides important performance
potential, the correct design of the engineer barriers system that meet
multiple security functions is essential.
1. Developing the conceptual technology for DNDR closure, based on all
experimental data obtained
Activities related to repository closure must be developed to meet the
national and international legislation.
DNDR Baita Bihor closure implies designing the closure system of the
access and ventilation tunnels and the remediation system of rock layers
above the storage area.
DNDR Baita Bihor closure will be based on the experience in mine closure
in Romania. There are significant differences between the closure of
existing mines in comparison to the radioactive waste repository,
influencing the closure plan and some aspects of closure technologies,
namely:
The period of institutional control.
In case of ore extraction mines, the post-closure control period is
generally 30 years. For radioactive waste repositories containing
radionuclides of relatively short life, less than 30 years, such as DNDR
Baita Bihor, it is considered that radioactive decay up to an acceptable
level is achieved after 10 half-lives, which means that the
institutional active control and passive control period shall be 300
years.
Waste stability.
Radioactive waste is fixed in a cement matrix that transforms them into
a solid form, acceptable for storage. Radioactive waste packages
consisting of the metal container filled with radioactive waste
immobilized by cementing, tested to withstand the conditions of
handling, transport and storage.
Radioactive contamination.
Unlike conventional mines, at DNDR Baita Bihor, the radiation field,
especially the risk associated with the exhausted radioactive sources
inventory, requiring protection and handling measures specific to these
types of waste.
The main components of the closure systems at DNDR Baita Bihor are:
1. The roof consisting of rock layers partially altered by mining
activities; 2. Buffer filling in the storage galleries; 3. Separation
walls between the storage galleries and the access tunnel; 4. Sandwich
fillings of the access and ventilation tunnels; 5. Sealing plugs of the
access and ventilation tunnels; 6. drainage systems; 7. Markings
indicating the presence of closed repository for future generations; 8.
Waterproof layer of Xypex additive gunite on the walls of the access and
ventilation tunnels; 9. Porous cement layer on the floor of the access
and ventilation tunnels.
In order to close the Baita Bihor DNDR repository, to restore the
natural environment in the entrance area of the access gallery 50 and to
ensure the sealing of the storage system, three different constructive
solutions for refurbishing the degraded area of the roof of DNDR Baita
Bihor were analyzed and described in detail, as follows:
-Alternative 1 - The execution of terrace landscaping projects
and the restoration of the excavated area and the access area into
gallery 50, on an estimated area of 13100 m2;
- 2 Alternative – The installation
of a geogrid on the entire degraded surface, in order to restore the
excavated area and the access area into gallery 50, on the same
estimated area (13100 m2); - Alternative 3 – The
execution of terrace landscaping projects and the restoration of the
excavated area and the access area into gallery 50, on an estimated area
of 3600 m2 and the installation of geogrids, on the remaining
area of 9500 m2.
Each of the three variants can be carried out in two sub-variants for
closing the repository:
- Subalternative A which includes the decommissioning of the
reception platform, the demolition of the administrative building and
the related infrastructure and covering this surface in order to
reconstruct the ambient, reforming the natural slope. -
Subalternative B which includes setting up a public museum in the
administrative building to present the evolution of DNDR Baita Bihor,
with the role of popularizing the storage system performance, to
increase public confidence in the security of the storage system. This
entire building can be used to accommodate institutional control
equipment of the repository.
As a result of the analysis performed, it is recommended to select the
Alternative 3B, in terms of cost-benefit. Figures 4.1-1 and 4.1-2
show the design recommended.
|
Figure 4.1-1
Siting and arranged areas at DNDR, Băiţa, Bihor. |
|
Figure 4.1-2
Structural section through the roof of DNDR, Băiţa, Bihor
|
Access and ventilation tunnels are in an area where meteoric water
infiltration is important due to the reduction of the rock layer above.
In order to separate areas with different infiltration rates, it was
chosen to fill these tunnels with a sandwich filling. This filler has
the role of stabilizing the storage area by avoiding the formation of
subductions and layers of stagnant water in the storage area. This
technical solution was shown in stage II. Furthermore there were
provided two sections in which the crushed rock filling was mixed with
30% bentonite and 20% non-expandable clay, for the additional retention
of radionuclides escaped from the storage galleries. These sections will
be located adjacent to storage galleries and they represent an
improvement of the shutdown system.
In order to determine the DNDR Baita Bihor closure solution, there was
performed a characterization of the physical parameters of bentonite
used as buffer material in waste storage, through experimental
measurements conducted by partner P1, IFIN HH. In order to analyze the
time evolution of the concentrations of radionuclides from the
repository, there were made several runs of the AMBER 5.7.1 code on the
mathematical model established in the Preliminary Safety Report. The
parameter values, characteristic to bentonite and which were determined
experimentally, have been modified. The runnings indicated four cases of
evaluation in which radioactive isotopes Co-60, Cs-137 and I-241 were
followed, as they represent about 90% of the inventory.
The concentrations of above mentioned isotopes were analyzed, as they
are relevant to repository development itself ("near field")
being in direct contact with the waste and buffer material (bentonite).
The results’ analysis showed that it manifests an improvement in
radionuclides retention.
The overall conclusion of the calculations is that bentonite
characterized in experimental measurements has a positive role in the
overall behavior of the deposit, in post-closure period, exposure doses
calculated for individuals of critical groups being well below the
permissible limit.
|
Figura 4.1-4
Annual individual effective doses for the three critical groups
considered, added up after all exposure routes and all
radionuclides
|
2. Elaborating the final version of the conceptual technology for DNDR
closure. Setting up the parameters necessary for post-closure
monitoring.
Given the fact that within this project, the institutions involved have
actively cooperated in establishing the main elements and largely the
details of the Closure Plan, based on the experimental results, at this
stage there was developed the content of the "Closure Plan for the
National Repository for Low and Intermediate Radioactive Waste, Baita,
Bihor County(DNDR)" and its submission to CNCAN for approval.
For possible evolution modes of the post-closure stage, the repository
must be designed for the effective dose limit for members of the
population of 1 mSv/year, with an effective dose constraint of 0.3
mSv/year, taking into account all possible ways of exposure to
radiation. The safety evaluation studies should take into account
exposures resulting from the occurrence of events with extremely low
probability of occurrence.
- Effective dose limit used for comparison with safety criteria during
post-closure phase shall be assessed by reference to the critical group.
- Long-term security of repositories shall be achieved through a
favorable combination of the site characteristics, engineering
characteristics of the deposit concept, form and content of waste,
operating procedures and institutional controls. – A repository siting
shall be monitored during the post-closure period as long as
monitorization is a safety indicator, as shown in the safety analysis. -
Effective and safe isolation of waste depends on the performances of the
entire storage system. The contributions of different components of the
system to the repository safety are variable and depend on the storage
concept, site characteristics and closure period. - Waste acceptance
requirements and engineering barriers model shall be determined for each
site and storage concept and shall be set based on site-specific safety
assessment.
In accordance with the field practice, the stages associated to the life
cycle of a deposit are the following:
- Pre-operational phase, which includes the following activities: site
studying, design, siting and repository construction; - Operation phase,
which includes the following activities: operation and closure of the
repository; - Post-closure phase, which includes the following
activities: active institutional control and passive control of the
repository.
Regarding the confirmation of the waste immobilization matrix,
compression tests were carried out for the following systems:
cement – volcanic tuff – water (1: 0.1: 0.5); -ciment - bentonite -
water (1: 0.1: 0.5); cement paste (as reference system).
Samples were kept in laboratory conditions, as well as in real storage
conditions, in the most unfavorable areas in terms of moisture, yielding
relevant results. In order to implement a system with enhanced stability
and efficiency, a number of fillers were considered to prove/disprove
the opportunity to use them as buffer filler: alkaline concrete (BA)
with 30% cement, 15% lime, 25% clay, 30% water; bentonite concrete (BB)
with 30% cement, 10% bentonite, 30% clay, 30% water; bentonite mud (NB)
with 8.25% cement, 8.25% bentonite, 16.5% clay, 66% water, 1% calcined
soda; sand + bentonite (nb) in equal proportions; sand + bentonite +
clay (nba): 50% sand, 30% bentonite, 20% clay;
For STDR, BA and BB samples, compression tests were carried out, for
STDR, BA, BB and NB permeability tests were carried out, while BA, BB
and NB samples were tested for leaching. It was found that BA and BB
samples show increased resistance to compression in simulated
conditions, which can be explained by the fact that the clay, in the
presence of moisture, acts to the saturation of the matrix and water
absorption through the free pores, leading to a stable matrix in short
time. This, of course, contributes to increasing resistance for a longer
period and reducing cracks. At the same time, the STDR sample
demonstrated reliability in real storage conditions. All values obtained
are within the limits provided for storage without deterioration,
considering that resistance to compression for conditioning materials to
achieve engineering barriers have to be greater than 5 MPa.
Corrosion buffer simulated environments packages
In order to study the corrosion in the time of waste packages in contact
with buffer materials, tests were performed using miniature metal drums
(dimensions: 72 mm diameter x 110 mm height), similar to the waste
package; They are filled with waste conditioning material used in the
present (fig. 4.2-1). The test drums were embedded up to 3/4 of the
height of the drum in buffer filling materials mentioned above (STDR,
BA, BB and NB). Samples were placed in the experimental gallery at DNDR,
and are to be further reviewed every 6 months. After the first 6 months,
samples consisting of test metal barrels, embedded in NB, were
completely destroyed. Bentonite mud crashed and detached from the metal
drum. The barrel was etched all over the surface which was in contact
with bentonite mud. The other samples did not change visibly (fig. 4.2-2
÷ 4.2.4).
Figure4.2-1 Figure 4.2-2 Figure 4.2-3
Figure 4.2-4
Permeability tests on filling material
For determining the water permeability under pressure through concrete
samples, one sample was molded in the form of a cube with sides of 100
mm in the STDR recipe, BA (alkaline concrete) and BB (concrete
bentonite).
BA
and STDR samples were tested for permeability after 36 days from the
molding, during which they were stored in a thermostatic bath, in water
at 2000 C. Testing was carried out at a pressure of 30 bar
for 545 hours. The passage of water through the sample stopped
completely after approx. 300 hours. Only a few drops of water passsed
through the STDR sample and therefore it was not possible to calculate
the permeability coefficient. Through the BA sample passed 20 mL of
water, the permeability coefficient being 3.4 x 10-11 cm / s. The BB
sample was tested to determine the permeability after 112 days after
pouring, all the while being kept in the thermostatic bath, in water at
2000C. Permeation test was carried out with water pressure of
30 bar for 1152 hours. After this time 51 mL of water were harvested.
Darcy permeability coefficient of the sample is 2.6 x 10-11
cm / s.
Considering the results obtained, it can be concluded that the three
mixtures of materials studied, have properties to slow down the possible
migration of stored radionuclides, if damage is done to the conditioning
matrix.
Leaching Tests on the filling buffer material
For preliminary leaching tests, the samples for analysis were prepared
as follows: in metal test barrels was introduced a colored marker. After
28 days since the preparation, the samples were placed in the mixtures
set out above: BA, BB and NB (to simulate actual storage conditions).
After 7 more days, the samples were totally immersed in water (with the
same pH as that of the water collected by the drainage system of the
repository). One set of samples was placed in-situ and another set in
the laboratory. It was found that the values of pH and conductivity are
higher for BA samples due to the presence of quicklime. So far (tests
will be continued in the coming months) after aprox.12 months, the
tracer migration has not been highlighted, nor in the laboratory
samples.
This leads to the conclusion that under saturated conditions, the
studied conditioning matrix and filling materials exhibit good retention
properties. Increased pH and conductivity are more pronounced in the BA
sample due to the presence of lime.
Another aspect addressed in this stage refers to chemical and
radiological monitoring of the site, including monitoring of radon
emissions in order to evaluate the impact on environment. There are
presented the main elements of the monitoring program; if they are
confirmed as complete as it will be considered that it can be applied in
the closure, post-closure and active institutional control phase (except
repository area measurements).
Given the above mentioned and the fact that the repository is located in
an abandoned uranium mine, the Radon measurement in the DNDR repository
galleries is important for the protection of the occupationally exposed
personnel. In order to protect the staff, the repository was designed
and executed with a ventilation system, which aims to keep the
concentration of Radon, during the execution of radioactive waste
packages repository operations under the limitations imposed by the
existing rules (CNCAN Radiological Safety Norm) on the operational
radiation protection in mining and preparation of NMR 01 uranium and
thorium ore.
The theoretical basis was also established for the evaluation
methodology of radionuclides retention in conditioning and repository
systems: retention capacity of absorbent material for a particular
radionuclide is usually characterized by constant Kd
distribution.
The distribution constant is the ratio of the number of ions retained
per absorbent material unit and the number of ions remaining in the
volume unit if equilibrium is established between the two phases:
where:
(1)
C1 = ion concentration in solution remaining after the
equilibrium/balance; C2 = C0 - C1 the
concentration absorbed on the solid material; C0 = ion
concentration in the initial solution.
Equation (1) is valid under conditions of fully reversible variations.
In reality, it is found that the reversible desorption process is not
complete and is very slow. The degree of retention of a radionuclide by
an ion exchange material depending on many factors, including: the
chemical form of the radionuclide; Mineralogical composition; The
physico-chemical properties of the absorbing material; The
physico-chemical properties of the carrier solution.
As a result of the processes of sorption and desorption, the
radionuclide migration speed is much lower than that of the carrier
water. The efficiency of the repository system barriers which includes
also the locking system shall be checked through the monitoring system
described in Phase II which includes 20 points of sampling from the DNDR
supervised area. It is proposed that in the post-closure period of
active institutional control to be in operation only 7 key control
points of established characterization parameters.
3. The analysis of the evolution of DNDR fastenings in limit conditions.
Final scenarios for risk assessment.
The measures outlined in the closure strategy are in accordance with the
provisions from the mining field, the only major risk is represented by
the migration of radionuclides deposited before the time set for 300
years for the institutional control and unauthorized human intrusion in
the repository by damaging the fastenings. The risk analysis and the
assessment of the evolution of fastenings was done from two
perspectives:
1. A HAZOP study (Hazard and Operatibiliy Study) was performed to close
the repository to address all risks and hazards in a systematic manner.
2. Environmental risks associated with repository closure.
1. HAZOP study. The closure operation presents, in the life period of a
repository, the most important risk because it is estimated the need for
movement of large volumes of soil and stone. These risks can be
mitigated by improving the condition of the access road and the
development of safe and effective operating procedures for closure.
There have been a number of cases selected to investigate the
uncertainty in the parameterization and concept of the performance
assessment model, for the analysis of the sensitivity model (used to
help assess post-closure safety functions of the various barriers), and
to examine additional safety and performance indicators.
The results of these studies have shown that:
- the bentonite filling acts as a physical and chemical barrier on a
long-term for the migration of contaminants. - concrete walls and floor
drainage system actively provides a limited benefit (less than a factor
of two) on long-term safety. Assuming that the concrete remains
functional in the active sewage during active institutional control, it
has no significant effect on the dose compared to when it is degraded
over time. – the geosphere has long-term safety function to mitigate the
release of radionuclides in the biosphere. - the effect of leakage rates
from upper galleries on dose level was also estimated.
Increasing the drain storage facilities leads to preferential migration
of radionuclides down through the unsaturated zone. This increases the
travel time of radionuclides, causing decay of radionuclides with
relatively short life period as Cs-137.
The consideration of complementary safety and performance indicators,
such as intake on flora and fauna, and environmental concentrations show
that the calculated impact associated with post-closure scenario of
reference is acceptable and usually doses are at least two orders of
magnitude below the relevant "comparison" level.
2. Environmental risks
Regarding environmental factors, the pollution and sometimes the
irreversible degradation of these as a result of mining activities are
strong arguments for the application of standards and correct policies
for ecological restoration. Consistently, due to the present impact of
uranium mining, is summed a potential impact of radioactive waste
disposal. Consequently, within the risk assessment were considered both
activities and their cumulative impacts.
The objectives proposed in this phase were:
-
conducting an analysis of the evolution in time of environmental
quality, that determines the level of degradation or improvement of its
quality; - evaluating the environmental impact due to activities
carried out during the operation period, to establish a knowledge base
necessary to further address the issues of closure; - Identify and
classify impacts associated with mine closure of the repository; -
Establishing priorities for closure by identifying, analyzing and
assessing risks in the studied area - addressing risks from the studied
area in terms of natural or human hazards and of a more complex nature,
of interaction between them - NATECH (hazards and technological risks
caused by natural disasters), - development of a conceptual model of
closure, based on previously identified risks and impacts.
An effective strategy to address environmental quality factors and
identify local, regional and national priorities is represented by the
impact and risk assessment. An integrated method was used for
qualitative assessment of environmental impact and risk, which is the
new trend of combining both risk assessment procedures - environmental
impact. It takes account of environmental issues (impact and risk), of
cause - effect relationship and sources generating environmental impacts
and their consequences, especially if they are characterized by a high
probability event. The impact induced on each valued environmental
component is given by the ratio between the units of importance derived
of each environmental component and the quality of the environmental
component. Each environmental impact calculated according to a
particular quality indicator corresponds to an environmental risk, which
can be calculated for each environmental impact induced and subsequently
as an average of the values obtained either directly, considering the
average value of the induced impact on the respective environmental
component.
A preliminary analysis based on field data, on natural risk refers to
landslides. During mining works the landscape has undergone many
transformations that have led to its fragility and to the possibility of
geomorphological processes such as: landslides, mudslides, ravination.
We used the methodology for assessing the risk of landslides. In
assessing the potential for landslides, following the work of covering
the area above the access gallery and the mine dump (present both at the
edge of the above ground platform and at the edge of the ventilation
manifold/gallery 53), were taken into consideration several criteria;
criteria were established on the basis of factors which by acting alone
or interconnected, can decisively influence the stability of slopes.
In the reference area for the sealing system, located above the entrance
portion in the access gallery, can be considered as the probability of
landsliding (P) and the corresponding risk coefficient (K) is reduced,
the remaining repository adjacent areas being included in the
probability of low sliding. The peculiarities of mountain relief and
vulnerability given by the mining activities have caused soil erosion on
significant surfaces. Directly influenced by the action of water and
wind, soil erosion is a form of degradation. Analyzing the soil erosion
susceptibility map of the study area was found that the highest amounts
of eroded soil are in the mining area and on the sides with steep
slopes.
In terms of risk management, the closure should be treated with the same
rigor as all other stages of the repository life cycle. In all these
stages, the major risks need to be addressed so as to minimize or even
eliminate threats to activity as usual for each stage.
It is well known that there is no risk 0, that is why we must pursue a
smaller value that is acceptable to the environment and to the
population.
The first step in estimating the risk factor of closure consists in
major risk classification of the closing and breaking it into smaller
subcategories, which allow a detailed picture of the risks of mine
closing. It starts from the concept of risk, namely from identifying the
typology associated to the closing, in order to reach a decision on the
optimal closing model.
The risk factor for the environmental component, calculated preliminary
for the fastenings at DNDR Baita Bihor emerged as being located around
600, being framed conservatively in the moderate risk class. Depending
on the established technical details of closing it may suffer positive
changes. The values obtained show that aspects of repository closing are
relatively low, but must be addressed in a responsible manner.
The risks on health and safety of the local population and surrounding
areas, requires special attention during closing. The financial risk is
relatively low because there are prerequisites for ensuring the
necessary funds given the importance of the objective. The risks
concerning the final mode of land use are the lowest, reflecting the
value of the land and its practically zero use in production,
post-closure.
The results obtained in this stage reflect the environmental and
radiological safety features specific to the studied perimeter and
specific aspects of closing which were taken into account in the
elaboration of the DNDR Baita Bihor Closing Plan. The closing is an
inevitable stage in the life cycle of a radiological plant and early
planning of this stage contributes to its ultimate success. Given that
DNDR Baita Bihor is located in an area contaminated with natural
radionuclides, such closing is similar to mine closing of this type.
Additionally, due to the presence of artificial radionuclides, coming
from institutional radioactive waste with greater mobility, increased
insulation measures are required for these radionuclides through the
design of appropriate engineering barriers.
This project deals with the possible impact of repository activities on
the environment, focusing on mine closing, as part of the life cycle of
mining, with the final destination as radioactive waste repository,
containing radionuclides of relatively short low and intermediate life
waste.
Nuclear safety issues are dealt with in terms of a repository located in
a geological cavity, applying DNDR-05. Essential aspects of the
proposed process of closing are approached and are described the
activities necessary to bring the system to a steady state.
The main conclusion of this stage is that the experimental program
confirmed the technical solutions for filling voids between waste
packages. By identifying all components of the locking system and
highlighting critical components was created the basis for the
preparation of DNDR Baita Bihor Closure Plan, using the data obtained in
the experimental program according to the plan of this project.
By
developing this stage, was set the stage for the next step "Proposing a
locking system for DNDR Baita Bihor" in which are to be included the
confirmed performances of the other identified components of the locking
system, including any CNCAN observations on the content of the closure
project.
The innovative results of activities carried out under this phase of the
project were disseminated through submission within prestigious
international conferences, being published in Proceedings edited in
2014. The paper "The present status of the closure plan of DNDR Baita
Bihor" presented in the session 106, no. 14023 at the Waste Management
conference 2014 in Phoenix, Arizona, USA, showed the characterization of
closure components of the DNDR closure plan.
The paper "Research on the development of DNDR closure plan Baita Bihor,
on corrosion monitoring", presented at the European Federation of
Corrosion Conference 2014, Pisa, Italy, has highlighted aspects of the
corrosion on components of the repository closure system. Also the
results of activities developed in this phase were used to compile the
first 5 chapters of "The Final Radiological Safety Report for the
National Radioactive Waste Repository for Low and Medium Activity, DNDR
Baita Bihor", submitted presently to CNCAN for evaluation.
Stage IV of the project
The disposal facility must be closed so as to ensure security functions
that were established in the security scenario for post-closure period.
The closure plan, including the transition to the operational phase of
closing should be well defined and practicable, so that the closure can
be done safely in the projected period.
For DNDR Baita, Bihor, were addressed both performance and regulatory
criteria, thereby achieving a credible assessment of the disposal
system.
The design criteria and evaluation of engineering barriers are the main
performance analysis models components and relate to design details for:
- The rate of water infiltration in the storage;
- The degree of compaction of layers of containers with radioactive
waste;
- The degree of compaction of buffer materials.
In the Preliminary Safety Report (PSR) 2006 the storage performance was
confirmed while presenting a series of recommendations to increase
storage system performance which were considered in this stage.
Locking System Components
The closing system components are:
1. The roof made of the upper layers of rock partially degraded by
mining activities;
2. Sandwich fillings of the access tunnels and ventilation;
3. Plugs for closing access and ventilation tunnels;
4. Markings to indicate the presence of the repository closed for future
generations.
The closing system components, classified into primary and secondary
components are used to minimize the potential migration pathways of
radionuclides.
The primary components are designed to minimize migration paths,
respectively the in and out of water from the galleries. In this
category are assigned the following components: waste conditioning
matrix, bentonite powder as buffer between the packages with radioactive
waste and the storage gallery walls. The sandwich fillings of the access
tunnels and ventilation are also considered to be primary components.
Secondary components are designed to protect primary components against
degradation and damaging. To this category belong the enclosure walls of
the storage galleries as well as the rehabilitated roof. The filler is
permeable for the water seepage, which will prevent the formation of
stagnant water layers. Each of the fill sections will be about 50m and
will be provided at the end from the gateway, with a layer of
impermeable mix of 3 m, consisting of 50% crushed rock, 30% bentonite
and 20% non-swelling clay.
At this stage it is proposed to increase the resistance of the bentonite
concrete membrane by reinforcement and incresing the waterproofing by
guniting the outer surface of the membrane with Xypex cement additives.
The space between the membrane and the sealing layer will be filled with
bentonite sludge (sludge) to seal and stabilize the packing of the
tronson_ (see_Fig._1).
din
Fig 1. Section type 1 for closing the access tunnels and ventilation
Additionally, the two sections will provide similar type 2 sections of
about 50 m, in which will be mixed 50% crushed rock with 50%
non-swelling clay. These additional sections will be adjacent to the
storage area on the two tunnels, namely, access and ventilation.
Improvements to sections of type 1 shall also apply to type 2 sections.
Proposing the closing system of the National Radioactive Waste
Repository Baita, Bihor
After the pre-closing period of 10 years, is provided the final closure
of the DNDR Baita, Bihor, by performing the following activities:
1 - Closing gallery 50, on the stretch of 240 m not used for storage, by
settling the filler materials in sections of 50 m, separated by
impermeable layers supported by membranes of reinforced bentonite
concrete provided with a waterproofing layer of cement with Xypex
additives applied by guniting with supportive and sealing role.
2 - Simultaneously, can start the closing of the gallery 53,
ventilation, according to the same methodology. Before the start of the
closing of this gallery will be build a concrete plug of 10 m at the
intersection with gallery 50;
3 - Construction of the plugs with length of 15 m, for sealing the
storage and preventing intrusions at the galleries 50 and 53 entry,
after completion of the filling of the galleries actitivity;
4 - Fitting the damaged area of the roof of DNDR Baita, Bihor by fitting
in terraces and restoring the excavated areas and the access area in
gallery 50, on a surface of
3600
m2 and installing geogrids in the remaining area of
9500
m2.
After completing the closure of galleries, will be performed the
following tasks:
1 - Fitting a Museum in the administrative building, displaying the
evolution of the Baita, Bihor DNDR, aiming to popularize the storage
system performance in order to increase public confidence in the safety
of the storage area;
2 - Continuing the environmental supervision, according to the plan
approved by CNCAN, for a period of 100 years, respectively, ensuring
active institutional control over this period;
3 - Passive institutional control, for a period of 200 years by
maintaining the warning system for the perimeter of institutional
control.
4 - Rendering in the economic cycle of unrestricted land use, after the
period of total institutional control of 300 years.
To analyze the efficiency of the natural and enginereed barriers of the
National Repository of Radioactive Waste Baita, Bihor were considered a
series of experiments in order to obtain information on their evolution
in time, determination / evaluation of migration times of radionuclides
stored by the three environments that constitute the engineered barriers
(Figure 2): conditioning matrix, filler materials (formes the object of
the present stage) and the geological environment as well as the
sorption / retention factors thereof on the same barriers. Through this
analysis can be assessed the impact over time of the storage system on
the environment and can intervene in the sense of optimization of
technologies, methods or materials used currently, if the situation
requires.
Fig 2.
System of engineered barriers
We have analyzed the current storage materials and technologies and
their alternatives for the two components on which we could act to
improve performance: the confinement matrix and the filler materials
(buffer) of the gaps between packages.
Studies were made on:
a) 3 dry filler materials / mixture (bentonite (A1), bentonite mixed
with sand (A2) and bentonite mixed with sand and clay (A3));
b) three solid filler materials / mixtures (mortar matrix currently
used, an alkaline concrete formula and a formula of bentonite concrete);
For moisture determination were performed three experimental setups that
were kept in-situ in the storage, in real conditions of humidity and
temperature.
The experimental assemblies were carried out so as to simulate the
storage mode, in the sense that samples have been molded in the plate
drums (H = 112 mm and diameter = 75 mm) using the recipe used for
embedding radioactive waste (cement mortar). These have been stacked on
generators in three assemblies, the gaps being filled with the three
above mentioned mixtures: A1, A2 and A3.
Determination of bentonite moisture used at DNDR Baita, Bihor, under
actual conditions of use
Four samples of bentonite were taken from DNDR, Baita - Bihor, from the
galleries 50, 27/1, 27/2 and out of the storage place in sacks of
bentonite.
An amount of 100 g of bentonite of each sample was dried in an oven at
100 ° C, up to constant mass and was determined the moisture content of
each sample obtaining the following results: gallery 50 - 21%, 27/1 -
16.4 %, 27/2 - 16.4% and the bentonite in the storage - 11.9% moisture.
Fig 3. Experimental slides in order to determine the moisture content in
real conditions and results obtained
The slides were stored for 12 months in the experimental gallery DNDR
Baita, Bihor. The highest moisture was recorded in the experimental
slide A1, in which the filler is bentonite and the lowest in the
experimental slide A3 in which the filling material is bentonite + sand
+ clay.
Adsorption tests for the three types of tested materials A1, A2 and A3
in order to establish the degree of retention for the two radionuclides
relevant in terms of radioactive inventory in the storage - Cs-137 and
Co-60.
As a conclusion, the conducted research program yielded the following
results:
The methodology was applied to determine the ability of sorption (Rs)
and desorption (Rd) of the indigenous natural ion exchangers
(bentonite and bentonite-based mixtures considered in this project). For
the same working conditions the time to balance the radionuclides
studied ranged from 48-72 hours. In table 1 were presented the values of
distribution constants Kd obtained for the three
mixtures/blends A1, A2 and A3.
Table 1. Values of distribution constants Kd obtained for A1,
A2 and A3.
Additives / exchangers |
Granule sizes (mm) |
Kd (ml/g) |
137Cs |
60Co |
Bentonite (A1) |
0,2 |
1362,20 |
272,80 |
Bentonite: sand–1:1 (A2) |
0,2 - 3 |
913,22 |
201,11 |
Bentonite: sand : clay–3:5:2 (A3) |
0,2 - 3 |
1105,20 |
233,70 |
An important finding of this research was to highlight the very slow
speeds of desorption processes, which means that the sorption processes
on the materials studied, having the behavior of natural ion exchangers,
are almost irreversible.
From experimental data is observed a very good behavior of the three
types of materials analyzed in the sense that the retention is
substantially complete after 40 days. Based on the conducted
experiments, for the analysis of the evolution in time of concentrations
in these compartments, computations with AMBER code have been made on
the mathematical model established in RPS 2006 in which were modified
the values of the parameters of A1, A2 and A3 proposed fillers.
Following the runs were obtained four cases to assess the behavior of
radioactive isotopes Co-60, Cs-137, in terms of migration in the storage
system.
We analyzed the concentrations of the isotopes mentioned above in the
storage system compartments, as they are relevant in the context of this
study for the evolution of the deposit itself, being in direct contact
with the waste and buffer materials (bentonite powder, bentonite powder
: sand, bentonite powder : sand : clay).
The obtained cases were: Reference case, in which we kept the
input values from the model
achieved
in the preliminary safety assessment, except for the operational period
extended to 2040; Case A1, where, in the AMBER file, we replaced
the values
of
the characteristic parameters of the filling material "bentonite
powder"; Case A2, where, in the AMBER file, we replaced the
values
of
the characteristic parameters of the filling material "bentonite
powder:sand"; Case A3, where, in the AMBER file, we replaced the
values
of
the characteristic parameters of the filling material "bentonite
powder:sand:clay". There were obtained the results shown graphically in
Figure 4.
Figure 4. Maximum concentration [Bq/m3] in the compartment
[Bentonite], in the compartment [Concrete_Floor], in the compartment
[Concrete_Drain] and in the compartment [Active_Drain_1]
The analysis of the results showed that the fillers proposed have
similar behavior in terms of radionuclides retention in the compartments
analyzed, leading to their detention in the near field and delaying
their migration to the external environment.
There can be observed an increase in the concentration of isotopes
monitored in the analyzed compartments compared to the reference case,
which proves the retention capacity of the fillers. The explanation is
that the values
of
the distribution coefficients, Kd,
for
the elements Co-60 and Cs-137 are much higher than those used for the
reference case.
The final impact of the contribution of filling materials was observed
in the safety indicator represented by the annual total individual
effective dose summed up after all exposure routes and all
radionuclides, for the three critical groups defined in the vicinity of
the DNDR Baita, Bihor repository (Figure 5).
Critical groups are selected based on the assessment of the most likely
habits and occupations of the population groups that may be exposed to
incorporation of contaminants through the biosphere. Critical groups
considered are:
- Recreational, which may be exposed to: external radiation from
contaminated regolith and streams of water, inhalation of contaminated
dust and accidental ingestion of contaminated soil;
- Baita Plai, which may be exposed to: external radiation from
contaminated soil and water, inhalation of contaminated dust and
accidental ingestion of contaminated soil;
- Baita Village, which is similar in activities and habits to the
group "Plai Baita", except that the group is located farther from the
deposit, in Băiţa Village.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of these annual total effective individual
doses summed up after all routes of exposure and all radionuclides for
the three cases analyzed A1, A2 and A3.
It can be seen that there are two periods in the post-closure evolution
of the deposit, where the effective dose received by a member of the
critical groups reaches peak values:
- More than 100 years, and 4582 years respectively, after the time
considered zero (1985) for critical groups "Recreational" and "Plai
Baita"
- More than 100 years, and 4076 years respectively, at the time
considered zero (1985) for critical group "Baita Village".
Figure 5. Annual individual effective doses for the three critical
groups considered, summed up after all routes of exposure and all
radionuclides for Cases A1, A2 and A3
From the study of dose values presented in this paper, it was found a
decrease compared to the reference case, in which the filler modelled
was hypothetical, its characteristics being parameterized using data
from the published literature.
The experimental data obtained during the project yielded some of the
values necessary for qualitative analysis of the behavior of engineered
barriers.
Thus, there were determined by calculation the years necessary for the
radioactive front to reach distances of 10, 100, 500 and 1000 m away
from the repository in two versions: at speeds of groundwater flow of 10-3
m/day and at speeds of 1 m/day. Table 2 and Figure 6 presents the time
required for the radioactive front to reach certain distances from the
deposit in the worst case scenario (water front speed is 1 m/day),.
Table 2. The calculation of the time required (years) for the
radioactive front to reach certain distances from the deposit,
considering the speed of 1 m/day for A1, A2 and A3
Figure 6 . The necessary time (years) for the radioactive front to reach
certain distances from the deposit, considering the speed of 1 m/day for
Co-60 and Cs-137
Therefore it can be concluded that the use of bentonite and mixtures
based on bentonite and clay and sand as filling material for the gaps
between packages is a viable alternative given the results in terms of
capacity of absorption and retention, as well as the degree of moisture
in the actual storage conditions and under laboratory conditions; It
also can be put into practice in relatively simple technical conditions
suitable for DNDR Baita, Bihor.
Stage V of the project
The technical
solutions applied for the present at DNDR Baita-Bihor within this stage,
of project finalization, were confirmed and further operational
improvements recommended within the other stages of this project, are to
be carried out. The IAEA recommendations were taken into account in this
stage, representing the base items of the project.
Closing the
National Radioactive Waste Repository (DNDR) Baita-Bihor can be
considered the last important operating stage in completion of the
repository system.
The reference safety levels apply to a large number of radioactive waste
repository facilities, so they must be applied adequately, taking into
account the extent of the potential risk to the wastes
disposal. A gradual approach specific
to a certain facility should be applied, so that the previsions made and
the implementation means should be
adequate for the risks identified in the licensing documentation.
These recommendations represented the main objectives of this project,
all the activities being subordinated to these major objectives.
The safety scenario for a repository facility on its geological
placement presents
specific features compared to the
safety scenarios for other types of nuclear facilities concerning:
- post closure safety from the point of view of
operational safety;
- the period of time for developing the repository
concept, for building and operation of the facility
- solving the long term uncertainties which do not occur
in other nuclear facilities, often related to a specific stage
in developing the facility.
Safety scenario may also develop, based on the experience gained both
during construction activities and operation of the facility and
optimization process implementation. This is the case of the present
project of engineering
barriers optimization within the project of
DNDR Baita-Bihor closure. The safety scenario should identify the key
uncertainties which could influence safety and the necessary management
activities, especially during the research-development programs.
Post closer calculation showed that long term safety functions of the
repository and geosphere against environment and against radionuclides
release attenuation in the environment, in particular short life
radionuclides (e.g. Co-60) and those highly absorbed (e.g. Am-241), are
maintained during the whole institutional control period of 300 years.
The calculations show that some of the repository components (in
particular the waste matrix) can reduce the dose with 1 to 2 orders of
magnitude and the geosphere also reduces dose with maximum 2 to 3 orders
of magnitude for the reference post closer scenario.
Bentonite barrier used after 1996 reduces the doses with one order of
magnitude during the institutional control period.
Engineering barrier system within the repository is structured in:
radioactive waste confinement matrix, the materials (with bentonite) and
the technology for backfilling the gaps between the packages containing
the waste matrix and the host rock, which is the most important natural
barrier for DNDR Baita-Bihor. Consequently, the long
term
behavior of these barriers were assessed in this project, taking into
account both the experiments of IFIN-HH
partner and international experience in radioactive waste disposal.
Experimental Program developed within this project is part of the
coordinated research programs performed within IAEA projects and
demonstrated the efficiency of both waste matrix, as primary barrier and
host rock, as natural barrier, based on distribution and leaching
coefficients. The results showed that radioactive waste confinement
matrices used at DNDR Baita-Bihor provide radionuclides isolation by
decreasing the dose by approximately 2 orders of magnitude, and of host
rock, by decreasing dose with 3 orders of magnitude, in accordance with
Reference Post Closer Scenario and confirming the calculation performed
previously.
A durability analysis
was performed for the closing system components which completes the long
term isolation system of the radionuclides at DNDR Baita-Bihor.
The results acquired /preliminary evaluation emphasize that
matrices have parameters similar to grout in the technological flow of
conditioning radioactive waste, in the accepted limits for the
radioactive waste conditioning matrix. For this reason it can be
concluded that long term behaviour will be similar, not influencing the
analized repository system. Actually, materials, both those used at
present for conditioning radioactive waste and those which are to be
used, are types of cement concrete because the binder used in all cases
is cement. Cement represents the active part of the system and
sand represents the inactive part.
High values resulted from mechanical caracterization of the
matrices analised show that:
- Even if an important increase of cement concrete strength
takes place în the first 28 days of lifetime, a further increase
continues to take place, but its values are significantly lower.
- Water – cement ratio used is optimal; for values of this ratio of 0,38
to 0,4 the decrease is linear, so the decrease is proportional with this
ratio increase.
- Analised matrices do not contain or have a reduced contain
of rough pores due to the optimum water-cement ratio. This is
demonstrated due to the build up of cement solution in water which takes
place in the space between the agregate grains.
- Concrete strength is proportional with compression strength of
cement, that's why cement dose is of major importance. Strength increase
takes place due to cement dose increase.
- Micro fracture phenomenon is very reduced due to high ratio of
water-cement. For these values there is a small fracture because the
quantity of water lost is small so the contraction phenomenon is reduced
(when hardened cement paste shows contractions which generate stress).
- The repository system humidity has a positive contribution to the
cement concrete strength by reducing micro fractures
Evaluating the results from the laboratory and from samples
disposed in-situ for the backfilling materials the following conclusions
are envisaged:
-
dry materials humidity is very low, so they are considered optimal to be
used as backfilling materials;
-
using bentonite and dry mixtures of bentonite, sand and clay as
backfilling material for the gaps between packages is a good alternative
taking into account the results of sorption and relevant radionuclides
retention capacity.
Evolution of DNDR Baita-Bihor
During post-closure period of time these components will undergo
inevitable processes of degradation due to local conditions at DNDR
Baita-Bihor. Presence of water infiltration and of constant temperature
of approximately 13°C make possible microorganism growth which can
influence repository system components performances.
The general arrangement of DNDR Baita-Bihor concerning the actual
filling degree of the repository tunnels showed that, for the present,
in the repository are disposed 8944 drums of waste, placed in 8 of 11
tunnels for disposal. Drums fabricated of carbon steel for waste
disposal are of 400 L or of 200 L. Of all disposal tunnels, 5 are
already closed, 2 tunnels are in use at present for disposal and 3
tunnels are not yet in use. The repository is to be closed in 2040 by
closing all disposal galleries including a part of access gallery
transformed in a disposal gallery. Drain system remains functional until
the final stage of closure and will be closed together with access
tunnel closing plug installation, of 15m. Closure is necessary to
prevent evacuation of contaminated water from the disposal galleries to
the collecting reservoir and afterwards to the environment.
Monitoring of environment radioactivity will
continue for a period of approximately 100 years after repository
closure.
The evolution described hereinafter is estimated in the basic
scenario about post-closure safety evaluation of DNDR Baita-Bihor. Soon
after placing the drums into the galleries, drum steel begins to
corrode, so, in a few years, drums
loose
their sealing capacity and water can contact
the waste. Cement is fragile so that water flow would initiate micro
fissures in time, the fissures will increase and cement degrades
chemically as result of cement and meteoric water reaction which is not
in chemical balance with it.
In
case of galleries filled with backfilling bentonite, radionuclides
migrate (by advection, dispersion and diffusion) through bentonite
buffer with a specific migration rate of radionuclides sorbed in
bentonite. Anyway, various processes will come into to raise the
migration rate due to compaction and washing with seepage meteoric water
and by building up organic
complexing agents due to wood encasement
degradation. Seepage meteoric water drives bentonite either to drain
system of the repository, or to geosphere. Common draining with
galleries without bentonite is assumed to degrade faster, probably due
to bentonite plugging.
Post closer radiological calculation showed that long term safety
functions of repository and geosphere such as waste isolation against
accessible environment and attenuation of radionuclides releasing in
environment, especially for short life radionuclides (e.g. C0-60) and
those strongly absorbed (Am-241) are maintained all over the
institutional control period of time, of 300 years.
Assessment the
durability of access and venting tunnels closing system
At DNDR Baita-Bihor arranged in abandoned mine galleries, primary
barrier (radioactive waste matrix) represents the main engineering
barrier against radionuclides migration. Host rock (crystalline
formation, rough and impervious) is a natural, very important barrier
for radioactive waste isolation. Access and venting tunnels stand in an
area where meteoric water infiltration is important due to disturbances
induced by mining activities.
Technical solution selected to ensure separation of areas with different
rates of water infiltration consist in sandwich type backfilling. The
role of this type of backfilling is to stabilize the disposal area by
preventing and delaying water infiltration into the disposal galleries
and avoiding stagnant water build up in the repository area.
Tunnels will be closed by backfilling sections consisting mostly of
local tapped crushed rock (which will behave identically with host
rock). Sorption capacities of the backfilling material experimentally
determined, have similar values with those determined in similar cases
in other countries.
Separation role of the zones with different humidity
will be maintained at least during the
institutional control period, of 300 years, taking into account
isolation features of waterproof bed being composed of clay and
bentonite. Instead, the role of preventing radionuclide migration is
insignificant, taking into account preferential gravitational direction,
both for disposal galleries and for access and venting tunnels.
Closing and
sealing plugs durability assessment
Concrete plugs will be installed at the entrance zones of
every access and venting tunnel to discourage
intrusions. The life time of these components integrity should remain in
the limits of the other concrete components operation life time for DNDR
Baita-Bihor. In contrast with concrete matrices of waste packages
contact surface water/concrete will be smaller. As a result, these plugs
will keep on maintaining the blocking function of radionuclides
migration on horizontal direction a longer time after the degradation of
concrete matrices of radioactive waste packages. At the same time, the
massively of alkaline environment
induced by the concrete plug prevents migration of most of radionuclides
released from the disposal galleries and which could be driven out of
the repository. The main orientation of the radionuclides migration
which left the degraded matrix would be vertical. Migration on
horizontal orientation can take place through the drain system of the
disposal galleries. The drainage blocking will be performed depending of
radionuclides migration after repository closure.
Conclusively, the main role of the concrete plugs is stopping the
intrusions, the roles of stabilization and preventing radionuclides
migration being less important, during the post closure institutional
control period of 300 years.
Cover
endurance assessment
The hard rock beds over the disposal galleries of DNDR Baita-Bihor
represent the repository cover. In order to maintain the integrity of
surface area of the disposal zone, a technical solution was selected for
terrace arrangement and reconstruction of the excavated zone of the
access tunnel on an area of 3600 m2 and installation of a
geogrid on an area of 9500 m2. By reconstructing this
zone, the natural gradient of 20% is provided with vegetative soil in
order to reduce the seepage rate by
evapotranspiration and gravitationally drain along the gradient.
Waterproof is provided by disposing a geogrid
on a textile support. This geomembrane
will be
disposed on a compacted gravel bed of 0,5m thickness as coating support.
The terraces will be filled by disposing a crushed rock filling for
gradient build-up. The filling will be protected against sliding by a
support wall installed at the edge of each terrace.
The main materials used for zone reconstruction are natural, such
as crushed rock,
gravel, sand, clay,
known for endurance features. The geomembrane
fabricated of polyethylene of high density represents the
synthetic material with very high endurance, of the order of hundreds of
years towards a thousand years. Also,
the
geogrids fabricated of synthetic
plastic material with high endurance (polyester fibers), ensure soil
stabilization, including vegetation development which provides removal
of an important amount of water from the surface by absorption. Taking
into account the requirement for natural gradients, during the
reconstruction of the affected zone out of mining activities, it is
considered that the roof endurance would raise significantly, which
results in preserving the zone seepage limitation function towards the
galleries of DNDR from Baita-Bihor all over the institutional control
period. As a matter of fact, the ability of control and retrieval would
remain at least 100 years after repository closer, during the active
institutional control, in case of any unpredictable failure of the roof.
Assessment of
warning markers in the repository area
Markers are passive systems that have the role to warn about the
presence of o human construction, dangerous for public and to provide
protection of the future generations against the risk of inadvertent
intrusion into the repository. For selecting the arrangement alternative
of a dedicated museum in the actual administrative building, occurred
the opportunity of permanent control of the disposal area at least 30
years after DNDR closure. Further, a periodic control will be appointed
through which the warning systems integrity will be controlled to
provide their maintenance. This 70-100 years period will finalize the
active institutional control period.
The next period is the passive control period during which the
permanently marking systems durability becomes essential. The
registration and information maintenance system will have an important
role in providing warning systems integrity for the waste disposal at
DNDR Baita,Bihor. At the same time, it is possible
that more performant
warning systems to be developed in the future
in accordance with the evolution of technological and information
systems.
Conclusively, long term warning and surveillance set of actions provided
for DNDR Baita-Bihor are expected to result in maintaining the integrity
of the disposal system all over the institutional control period, of 300
years, till the radioactive dose will decrease under acceptable
limits.
Conditioning matrices
In previous stages,
demonstrative experiments were performed and the performances assessment
for engineered barriers
currently
implemented at DNDR Baita-Bihor was analyzed (Fig. 2-1). Based on a
literature study were identified and evaluated optimized matrices for
radwaste conditioning, as well as different backfilling materials, in
order to achieve a real evaluation on the possibilities of improving
their characteristics from the major objective point of view which is to
assure the long term radiological safety functions of the disposal
facility.
Figure 2-1: Elements of the engineering barriers system during the
operational phase
Were taken into consideration new types of conditioning matrices,
already analyzed or foreseen to be analysed in the near future:
(a) for immobilization of radioactive concentrates resulted from aqueous
radioactive waste treatment by filtration, ultrafiltration and reverse
osmosis combined methods;
(b) for conditioning of aluminum radioactive waste (reactive wastes)
originated from the decommissioning of VVR-S research reactor from
IFIN-HH;
(c) for conditioning of radioactive graphite (i-graphite) from thermal
column of VVR-S research reactor.
Nowadays,
conditioning of institutional radioactive waste disposed at DNDR
Baita-Bihor is performed by cementation being used for more than 30 y a
cement mortar matrix validated through different studies and
technologies - for 220 L and 420 L licensed waste packages (fig. 2-2).
Conditioning is achieved by incorporating radioactive waste in a
monolith of a cementitious matrix within
100 L
drum which is
overpacked
in a 220 L drum
with cementitious material filling the gap between the inner and outer
drums
(the
process is similar for the 220 L drum that is
overpacked
in a drum of 420 L).
Figure 2-2: Disposal package components
Assessments of radioactive concentrate conditioning matrix
Liquid radioactive waste could be characterized by a complex chemical
composition: salts, complexing agents, radioactive waste generated in
the production of radiopharmaceuticals, decommissioning of VVR-S
research reactor etc. These waste are treated by combined methods,
resulting a radioactive concentrate with a complex chemical composition.
This concentrate must be embedded in a matrix based on Portland cement,
physically, chemically and mechanically stable, that meets the waste
acceptance criteria (WAC) established and approved for the National
Radioactive Waste Repository Baita-Bihor and also the radiological
safety requirements under interim storage and disposal.
Liquid radioactive waste stored at STDR is considered as aqueous
solutions as the water constitute more than 99%. Radionuclides and
non-radioactive impurities are in most various forms in aqueous
solutions, and so the following main forms of impurities in aqueous
solutions should be mentioned:
·
suspended particles or emulsified oil products (particle sizes from 10-7
m up to several millimeters),
·
colloidal particles or micelles (particle sizes from 10-8 m
up to 10-7 m),
·
dissolved organic substances and/or surfactants (particle sizes from 10-9
m up to 10-8 m),
·
ions (particle sizes from 10-10 m up to 10-9 m).
The goal of the treatment process is the minimization of the
volume of liquid radioactive waste and
the engendering of a secondary waste product (concentrate) which can be
immobilized, obtaining packages suitable for disposal. The studied
matrices were based on cement mortars as reference samples and cement
matrices with simulated radioactive concentrate containing stable
isotopes. The adequacy for the preparation of packages disposed at DNDR
Baita-Bihor has been demonstrated, being in accordance with the
requirements established for the conditioning matrices (strengthening,
setting time, leachability).
Factor that could affect the closure system stability
Closure system consist of two major components:
- Improvement / coverage works of zones
located above the access gallery;
- Plugs and chambers closure systems (sections) inside the repository.
The considered factors are: accidental or deliberate human intrusion,
freeze-thaw phenomenon and seismicity.
Anti-intrusion analysis of proposed closure system was based on the
following scenarios:
- Execution of a drilling or a exploration gallery in the repository
area;
- Accidental or deliberate intrusion of an individual or group of
individuals.
Both scenarios are considered to occur strictly after operational and
institutional control periods.
Deep under the repository exist molybdenum deposits, but due their
position, it is unlikely that any gallery and / or boreholes used for
access to molybdenum deposits to pass through the repository. However,
it is possible to intercept the contaminants front released from the
repository. The effective individual dose rates for operational and
institutional control phases were calculated in the Preliminary Safety
Analysis of DNDR being demonstrated the efficiency of disposal system.
According to territorial seismic zoning of Romania, Baita-Bihor
perimeter is classified as Grade VI of seismic activity. The site
seismicity is weakly influenced by Vrancea seismic zone and, also, by a
weak local seismic activity.
The maximum
frost depth is
evaluated
to be 1.00 m. The repository is placed about 160-180 m below the
surface, therefore the occurrence of
freeze-thaw phenomena is not likely to occur.
3. Conclusions
Since 1985, when the
repository was put into operation, until 1996,
the waste drums were simply stacked in the galleries, no backfilling
material was used to fill up the empty spaces between the packages.
Basically, the only barriers were considered conditioning matrix and
host rock. With the development of national and international
regulations, long-term safety analysis have been initiated. These
analysis highlighted the requirement to
implement additional engineering measures
applicable
to all disposal systems, as follows:
- more robust packages with additional shielding,
thicker
or obtained from more resistant materials, were developed;
- recipe cement matrix (for embedding radioactive waste) was optimized;
research studies to identify stable matrices to condition "exotic"
radioactive waste as activated metallic aluminum and i-graphite were
started;
- modernization works to up-grade the entire disposal system were
carried-out: replacement of the existing electric, ventilation and
drainage systems, waterproofing of the transport gallery by
reinforcement and guniting are only some of
them.
- a preliminary safety analysis of the repository, after 20 years from
the commissioning, was carried out. This analysis proved the disposal
system viability and provided a series of recommendations to improve the
safety and security. Among these recommendations was the analysis of the
backfilling material (operational and post-closure issue), the enclosure
of galleries with plugs (closure issue), etc.
During the project stages, studies and experimental work were conducted
to optimize the conditioning matrices and, also, to assess various types
of fillers. At the same time, the assessment of the barriers system
performance in terms of structural
stability and security/ safety functions as retention and delay of
disposed radionuclides migration for a stated
period, beyond which radioactive effects are insignificant.
Based on the obtained results, the following conclusions can be
highlighted:
- Engineering barriers systems, developed and implemented in the
operational phase, are suited to the purpose, the containment and
isolation of radioactive waste;
- Host environment is suitable, the fracturing
degree
induced by mine
exploitation is relatively low, as the very low volume of infiltrating
water demonstrated;
- Backfilling materials evaluated can be successfully used in disposal
system;
- The closure system and plugs proposed for closure of the repository
drive to the conclusion that they assure the long-term security of the
whole disposal system.
In conclusion, the objectives of the final stage and, consequently of
the project were fully meet, being created the prerequisites for the
development of closure strategy and Conceptual Closure Plan for National
Repository for Low and Intermediate Radioactive Waste, Baita-Bihor.
The results obtained in the frame of this project
were the basis of the Final Safety
Report of DNDR Baita-Bihor, submitted to National Commission for Nuclear
Activities Control, and, also, will be used in the development of
Conceptual Closure Plan that should
comply
with
the national legislation requirements
and international recommendations.
|